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ADVANCING AUER IN AN ERA OF RETREAT
STEPHEN M. JOHNSON*

At the dawn of the modern administrative state, the Supreme
Court held, in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Company, that an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation is “of controlling weight unless it is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”1 A half century
later, the Court retained that approach in Auer v. Robbins,2 a decision
authored by Justice Scalia. Auer deference is generally regarded as the
most accommodating standard of judicial review applied by courts to
agency decision-making.3
Although the Supreme Court created Seminole Rock/Auer deference more than seventy years ago, the Court has created exceptions to the
doctrine over the years4 and Justices Scalia,5 Thomas,6 Roberts7 and Alito8
have questioned or criticized the basic premise of the doctrine in recent
years.9 Further, legislators have indicated their displeasure with Auer

*

Walter F. George Professor of Law, Mercer University Law School. BS, JD Villanova
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1
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Company, 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
2
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
3
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 516 (2011).
4
See infra notes 75–80, and accompanying text.
5
See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 U.S. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (raising concern about a conflict between the deference and the
Administrative Procedures Act and a concern that the deference provides an incentive
to agencies to draft vague rules); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 U.S. 1326, 1341
(2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the deference on
separation of powers grounds); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 U.S. 2254, 2266
(2011) (Scalia, J.,concurring) (raising separation of powers concerns). Although he authored Auer, Justice Scalia became its harshest critic over time.
6
See Perez, 135 U.S. at 1199, 1214 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
7
See Decker, 133 U.S. at 1326, 1339 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that
it “may be appropriate to reconsider” Auer in a case where “the issue is properly raised
and argued”).
8
See Perez, 135 U.S. at 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (indicating concerns about Seminole Rock, but preferring to await a case
in which the validity of the doctrine could be “explored through full briefing and
argument”).
9
See Kevin O. Leske, Chipping Away at the Rock: Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association
and the Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 106–07 (2016); see
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deference by introducing bills in Congress in 2016 and 2017 that would
require courts to interpret the constitution, statutes and regulations de
novo,10 rather than to accord agencies deference under Auer or Chevron.11
While legislators and a few Supreme Court Justices are suggesting that Auer deference should be narrowed or eliminated, critics are
concerned that some federal courts may be expanding the reach of Auer
and according that level of deference to agency interpretations of guidance that interprets regulations, as opposed to simply interpretations of
regulations.12 Those critics refer to this as “second level” Auer deference.13
This concern was raised most recently in a petition for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court filed by the Pacific Legal Foundation (“PLF”)
in Foster v. Vilsack.14 PLF argued that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit inappropriately accorded Auer deference to
also Michael P. Healey, The Past, Present and Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form and
Function in Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 62 KAN. L. REV.
633, 657 (2014).
10
See Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017, H.R. 76, 115th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2;
Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong., 1st Sess.; Separation of Powers
Restoration Act of 2016, S. 2724, 114th Cong., 2d Sess.; Separation of Powers Restoration
and Second Amendment Protection Act, H.R. 4321, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. (2016).
11
See Orrin Hatch, Congress Must Act to Restore Accountability to the Regulatory Process,
YALE J. REG. (Sept. 22, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/congress-must-act-to-restore-account
ability-to-the-regulatory-process-by-senator-orrin-g-hatch/ [https://perma.cc/AA5S-FWAS].
The Supreme Court, in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984), created a deferential review standard that courts use when reviewing agencies’ interpretations of statutes (rather than regulations, the focus of Auer) if the agencies have
been given, and exercised, authority to make decisions having the force of law. While the
proposed legislation would eliminate Chevron deference and Auer deference, the bills would
not eliminate all deference to agency decision-making. Prior to creating the Auer and
Chevron deference standards, the Supreme Court, in Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134
(1944), created a deferential review standard of judicial review for agency decision-making
that continues to apply today to decisions that are not governed by Auer or Chevron. The
legislative history for the bills that have been introduced to eliminate Chevron and Auer
deference indicates that Congress does not intend, through the legislation, to eliminate
Skidmore deference. See William Funk, Why SOPRA is Not the Answer, YALE J. REG .:
NOTICE AND COMMENT (Sept. 22, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/why-sopra-is-not-the
-answer-by-william-funk/ [https://perma.cc/H26Y-RJ7T] (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
12
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Foster v. Vilsack (U.S. Aug. 8, 2016) (No. 16-186),
http://www.pacificlegal.org/file/documents/Foster-1-1523-Cert-Petition.pdf [https://perma.cc
/TE3L-Z59Q] [hereinafter PLF Cert. Petition]. The term “guidance” is used in this Article
broadly to refer to the full panoply of non-legislative rules that interpret agency regulations.
13
Id. at 18; see also Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Foster v. Vilsack, No. 16-186 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2016) (No. 16-186), http://www.pacific
legal.org/file/Cato-Institute-Amicus-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/V833-YP8R].
14
See PLF Cert. Petition, supra note 12, at 20.
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the Natural Resource Conservation Service’s interpretation of a guidance
document interpreting a regulation when the court upheld the agency’s
determination that the petitioners, Arlen and Cindy Foster, were converting wetlands to farmland in violation of the Food Security Act of 1985.15
The Supreme Court ultimately denied the cert. petition,16 so the
Court did not provide any guidance regarding whether courts owe any
deference, or how much deference courts owe, to agency interpretations
of guidance that interprets regulations—the “second level” Auer deference
issue.17 Although the Court did not provide guidance, it is clear that courts
should accord agencies some deference when reviewing the agencies’ interpretations of guidance interpreting regulations and should not review the
interpretations de novo. For several reasons outlined in this Article,
courts should at least accord agencies Skidmore deference and possibly
much more.18 After all, if a court were reviewing the underlying guidance
that the agency interpreted, rather than the agency’s interpretation of
the guidance, the court would accord the guidance Skidmore deference
if it interpreted a statute19 and Auer deference if it interpreted a regulation.20 It is not clear, therefore, why a court should abandon all deference
when it is reviewing the agency’s interpretation of that guidance.
While Skidmore deference would seem to be a minimal requirement, if Auer deference survives in its current form or in some modified
form outlined in this Article, there are strong arguments to suggest that
courts should accord Auer deference or a modified Auer deference to agencies’ interpretations of guidance interpreting regulations just as they
apply that deference to agencies’ interpretations of regulations. Here’s
why: first, all of the reasons that courts and academics have identified
15

Id. at 3–11, 21.
See Order Denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Foster v. Vilsack (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017)
(No. 16-186), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/010917zor_c07d.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TS32-38QB].
17
The focus in the case and in this Article is not broadly the level of deference to agency
interpretations of guidance documents, but specifically the level of deference to agency
interpretations of guidance documents that themselves interpret regulations. That is the
“second level” of Auer deference.
18
See infra Part III.
19
See U.S. v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding that Skidmore applies to review
of an agency interpretation of a statute when the agency has not been delegated authority to make decisions having the force of law); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S.
576, 587 (2000) (indicating that agency interpretations articulated in opinion letters,
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, “all of which lack the
force of law,” are entitled to Skidmore deference, rather than Chevron deference).
20
See infra Part III (noting that courts will defer to agency interpretations of regulations
under Auer, regardless of the manner in which the agency reached the interpretation).
16
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as justifications for deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation under Auer (including expertise, the agency as the drafter and
uniformity) apply equally to an agency’s interpretation of its own guidance interpreting a regulation.21 Second, the criticisms that have been
raised to applying Auer deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation (that Auer encourages agencies to draft vague rules) do not
apply as forcefully to applying Auer deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own guidance interpreting a regulation.22 Finally, the negative
repercussions outlined in this Article that would flow from eliminating
Auer deference for an agency’s interpretations of its regulations will flow
equally from refusing to accord Auer deference to an agency’s interpretations of its guidance interpreting its regulations.23
Part I of this Article begins by examining several cases cited by
PLF in its cert. petition to determine whether there is, as PLF asserts,
a trend toward “second level Auer deference” in the federal courts. Part II
of the Article focuses on the traditional application of the Auer standard,
exceptions to the standard, the rationales for the standard, criticisms
raised to the application of the standard and several suggestions advanced by academics to reform the standard. Part III then outlines the
reasons why courts should accord Skidmore, Auer or a modified version
of Auer deference when reviewing an agency’s interpretation of its own
guidance interpreting regulations.
I.

A TREND TOWARD “SECOND LEVEL” AUER DEFERENCE?

Before focusing on whether courts should accord Auer, Skidmore
or any deference to an agency when reviewing the agency’s interpretation
of guidance interpreting a rule, it is useful to examine whether courts are
according any deference to agencies in those cases. In its cert. petition for
Foster v. Vilsack, PLF cited three federal appellate court decisions that
allegedly addressed “second level” Auer deference.24
The first case, Elgin Nursing and Rehabilitation Center v. United
States Department of Health and Human Services, involved a challenge
to a determination by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(“CMS”), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services,
that Elgin violated federal food safety regulations that require long-term
care facilities to “serve food under sanitary conditions” when Elgin served
21
22
23
24

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra notes 171–72, and accompanying text.
See PLF Cert. Petition, supra note 12, at 18–23.
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eggs that were “soft cooked” to several of its nursing home residents.25
CMS had adopted an interpretive manual, the State Operations Manual,
to provide guidance to facilities regarding when the agency would conclude that food was not “served under sanitary conditions” as required
by the regulations.26 While the manual included directions regarding the
proper preparation of eggs to ensure that they were “served under sanitary conditions,” the directions in the manual regarding the temperature
and consistency of eggs were ambiguous, and CMS interpreted the language in the manual to prohibit facilities from serving “soft cooked” eggs.27
When the case reached the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, the Department of Health and Human Services asked the
court to accord Auer deference to the agency’s interpretation of the State
Operations Manual (which interpreted the regulation).28 The court noted
that Auer deference traditionally applies to an agency’s interpretation of
its own rules, rather than the interpretation of a manual interpreting its
rules, which the court referred to as “Seminole Rock squared” deference.29
The court refused to accord the agency such deference, arguing that to do
so would encourage agencies to write ambiguous interpretive manuals
based on ambiguous regulations, would entirely cede the judicial function
of the judicial branch of interpreting the law to the executive branch and
would allow punishment of violations for which no person would have
fair warning.30 After rejecting the Department’s request for Auer deference, the court interpreted the manual using “traditional tools of textual
interpretation” and did not accord any deference to the agency.31
The second case cited by PLF, Atrium Medical Center v. United
States Department of Health and Human Services, also involved judicial
review of CMS’ interpretation of a manual.32 PLF characterized the
decision as a case where the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit applied Auer deference to an agency’s interpretation of a manual,33
but the court’s opinion is far more complex than PLF implies.34

25

718 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 491.
27
Id. at 491–92.
28
Id. at 492.
29
Id. at 493.
30
Id. at 493–94.
31
Elgin, 718 F.3d 488 at 494–95.
32
766 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2014).
33
See PLF Cert. Petition, supra note 12, at 23.
34
Judge Stranch begins the opinion for the court by describing the Medicare statutes and
regulations as “the most completely impenetrable texts within human experience” and
26
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The case centered on CMS’ determination regarding whether certain costs incurred by hospitals in rural Iowa and Cincinnati, Ohio should
be treated as “wages,” “wage related costs” or “paid hours” for purposes
of calculating local and national wage indices used to calculate reimbursement levels under the Medicare Act.35 Since the court was reviewing CMS’ interpretation of the terms “wages,” “wage related costs” and
“paid hours” that were used in a Provider Reimbursement Manual that
clarified requirements in the Medicare Act and regulations, it would appear, at first glance, that the Sixth Circuit was being asked to review an
agency’s interpretation of a guidance document that interpreted a regulation.36 Working from that assumption, one might conclude that when
the court accorded Auer deference to the agency’s interpretation of terms
in the manual, the court would be employing “second level” Auer deference, as PLF asserts.
However, in its analysis of CMS’ decision to treat various costs as
“wages” and “paid hours” for purposes of calculating wage indices, the
court noted that the rulemaking announcing the wage index “specifically
reference[d] and incorporate[d]” the sections of the manual that the agency
was interpreting in the case.37 Although the court stressed that the manual was not a “substantive rule” because the actual text of the manual
was not published in the Federal Register, the court noted that the agency
solicited and received comments on the sections of the manual at issue
when it promulgated the regulation establishing the wage index and incorporated those sections of the manual in the rulemaking notice.38 The
court also noted that the manual functions “as an essential part of the
wage index.”39 In light of those factors, the court concluded that the manual should be accorded Chevron deference.40 Although the court refused
to characterize the manual as a rule, it accorded the manual itself the
deference that is traditionally accorded to a regulation. To the extent
that the court subsequently accorded Auer deference to the agency’s interpretation of the manual,41 therefore, one might view the court’s action
as more closely resembling traditional Auer deference to an agency’s
advises readers that there are “slim hope[s] of rendering a comprehensible opinion.”
Atrium, 766 F.3d at 564.
35
Id. at 564–65.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
38
Id. at 571–72.
39
Id. at 572.
40
Atrium, 766 F.3d at 572–73.
41
Id. at 574–75.
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interpretation of its rules than “second level” Auer deference to an agency’s
interpretation of guidance that interprets a rule.
The final case cited by PLF was the Eighth Circuit decision that
PLF was asking the Supreme Court to overturn, Foster v. Vilsack.42 In
that case, Arlen and Cindy Foster were challenging a determination of
the Natural Resource Conservation Service (“NRCS”) that the Fosters
had converted prairie pothole wetlands for agricultural use in violation
of the Food Security Act of 1985.43 The statutory definition of wetlands
includes a requirement that land support a prevalence of hydrophytic
vegetation “under normal circumstances.”44 Regulations adopted by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), NRCS’ parent agency, provide
that when the vegetation on a site has been removed, in order to evaluate
whether that site meets the statutory requirements to be classified as a
wetland, the agency should determine “if a prevalence of hydrophytic
vegetation typically exists in the local area on the same hydric soil map
unit under non-altered hydrologic conditions.”45 In practice, USDA has
interpreted the “local area” requirement in the regulation to mean that
comparison sites must be located within the same “Major Land Resource
Area” (“MLRA”) as the site being evaluated.46 Consistent with that interpretation of its regulation, NRCS examined an unaltered prairie pothole
site in the same MLRA as the site on the Fosters’ land with the same
hydric soils as the site on their land and with similar wetland hydrology
as the site on their land.47 Based on the data from that comparison site,
NRCS concluded that “a prevalence of hydrophytic vegetation typically
exists in the local area on the same hydric soil map unit under nonaltered hydrologic conditions,” per USDA regulations, so that the prairie
pothole that the Fosters converted would support a prevalence of hydrophytic vegetation “under normal circumstances,” and, thus, meet the
statutory definition of wetlands.48
The Fosters challenged the NRCS’ decision to use the comparison
site that the agency chose to determine whether the site on the Fosters’

42

820 F.3d 330 (8th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 331–32.
44
See 16 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(27) (2012).
45
7 C.F.R. § 12.31(b)(2)(ii) (2016).
46
820 F.3d at 331, 335. MLRAs are “ ‘geographically associated land resource units’ demarcated by NRCS scientists ‘after a consideration of characteristics such as their
‘physiography, geology, climate, water, soils and land use.’ ’ ” See PLF Cert. Petition, supra
note 12, App. B27 n.10 (quoting Administrative Record (A.R.) 403).
47
Foster, 820 F.3d at 335.
48
Id. at 331–33.
43
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property was a wetland, but the Eighth Circuit upheld the agency’s decision on the grounds that the decision was not arbitrary, capricious or
contrary to the law.49 The Eighth Circuit did not cite Auer and did not
discuss any deference standards in its decision. Perhaps the Court could
have accorded Auer deference to NRCS’ interpretation of the term “local
area” in its regulation to mean “within the same MLRA,” but none of the
parties asked the Court to do so, and such deference would be traditional
Auer deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule, as opposed
to “second level” Auer deference.50 Despite the complete absence of any
discussion of Auer or agency deference, PLF characterized the case as an
example of a court according an agency “second level” Auer deference in
its cert. petition,51 which the Supreme Court ultimately rejected.52
Of the three cases cited by PLF to demonstrate a judicial trend
toward adoption of “second level” Auer deference, therefore, one rejected
Auer and reviewed the agency’s interpretation de novo,53 one reviewed
the agency’s decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard without discussing Auer, Skidmore or other deference regimes54 and one schizophrenic opinion applied Auer, but arguably not in a “second level” manner.55
While there may be courts that are beginning to expand Auer to apply to
agency interpretations of guidance that interpret regulations, PLF’s cert.
petition failed to identify strong examples of such a trend.
Nevertheless, the question of whether courts should accord deference to an agency’s interpretation of guidance that interprets a regulation is worth asking. The Fifth Circuit, in Elgin, interpreted the agency’s
guidance document de novo, without according the agency any deference.56
That seems misguided. In addition, simply because courts have not yet
applied Auer to agency interpretations of guidance that interpret regulations doesn’t mean that courts should not do so. Although it is unlikely
that courts will expand Auer in light of the more general assault on the
49

Id. at 334–35.
In the administrative proceedings that spawned the judicial proceedings, the deputy
director of the NRCS cited Auer as support for upholding the agency’s interpretation of
the regulatory term “local area” to mean within the same major land use area.” See PLF
Cert. Petition, supra note 12, at C27.
51
Regarding the Eighth Circuit’s decision, PLF argued “the deference afforded is that established by Auer, even if the Eighth Circuit cited other types of deference.” Id. at 20 n.10.
52
See supra note 17.
53
See supra notes 28–34 and accompanying text.
54
See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
55
See supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text.
56
See Elgin Nursing and Rehabilitation Center v. United States Department of Health
and Human Services, 718 F.3d 488, 494–95 (5th Cir. 2013).
50
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doctrine, there are strong arguments to support the application of the same
standard of review to an agency’s interpretation of guidance that interprets a regulation as to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation.
II.

AUER—BACKGROUND, CRITICISMS AND SUGGESTED REFORMS

A.

Background

In 1945, the United States Supreme Court was asked to review
the decision of the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration,
under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, to limit the maximum
price of crushed stone to $.60 per ton.57 The Administrator set the maximum price based on his interpretation of a regulation adopted by the
agency.58 The Court, in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Company, upheld
the agency’s decision, holding that the Administrator’s interpretation of
agency regulations is “of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation.”59 The Court did not, however, explain
why such deference was due.60
The decision arose in the context of price controls and was only
applied in that context for many years.61 In addition, early decisions applying the standard limited deference to cases where the agency’s decision
was announced in an official publication.62 Further, in Seminole Rock and
in many of the early cases applying Seminole Rock, courts only accorded
deference to agencies’ interpretations of regulations after engaging in an
independent and searching review of the language of the regulations.63
Over time, though, courts began applying the doctrine in much
broader contexts to a broader range of formats of agency decisions and
with a much more lenient review of the language of the regulations. The
Supreme Court articulated some basis for the Seminole Rock deference
in two cases in 1991, Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission64 and Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,65 when the Court
57

See Bowles, 325 U.S. at 411–12.
Id. at 413–15.
59
Id. at 414.
60
See Healey, supra note 9, at 636.
61
See Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole
Rock, 65 EMORY L.J. 47, 52, 54 (2015).
62
Id. at 54–55.
63
Id. at 60–61; see also Healey, supra note 9, at 639–40.
64
499 U.S. 144 (1991).
65
501 U.S. 680 (1991).
58
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suggested that Congress’ delegation of lawmaking powers to agencies
justified the deference.66
By 1997, the Court had greatly expanded the reach of Seminole
Rock, and the Court, in Auer v. Robbins, applied it to uphold the Secretary
of Labor’s interpretation of a regulation used to determine exemptions
from overtime pay requirements under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
even though the Secretary advanced the interpretation of the regulation
for the first time in an amicus brief in the litigation surrounding the implementation of the rule.67 Even though the Court issued its Auer opinion
more than a decade after the Court created a deferential standard of review
for agency regulations in Chevron v. NRDC (identifying numerous rationales for the deference), the Court did not discuss the relationship between
the Auer and Chevron standards or provide any post-Chevron rationale
for the deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.68
The deference that courts accord agencies under Auer is generally
regarded as stronger than Chevron, Skidmore or any other deference
standard.69 One study suggests that the Supreme Court upholds agencies’
interpretations of their own regulations 91% of the time under Auer.70 By
comparison, the rate of judicial approval of agency decisions across all
appellate courts under Chevron ranges from 64–81% based on a variety
of studies, and the rate of approval under Skidmore ranges from 55–71%.71
Although Auer has traditionally been regarded as the most deferential
66

See Leske, supra note 9, at 110.
519 U.S. 452, 454–57, 459–63 (1997).
68
See Healey, supra note 9, at 648.
69
See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 61, at 48; see also Nicholas R. Bednar, Defying
Auer Deference: Skidmore as a Solution to Conservative Concerns in Perez v. Mortgage
Bankers Association, De Novo, MINN. L. REV., June 24, 2015, http://www.minnesotalaw
review.org/2015/06/defying-auer-deference-skidmore-solution-conservative-concerns
-perez-v-mortgage-bankers-association/ [https://perma.cc/F7KE-N44G].
70
See William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083, 1104 (2008); Pierce & Weiss, supra note 3, at 516; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What
Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 83 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 83
(2011). As Professor Richard Pierce notes, however, the 91% rate was based on a review
of a very small number of cases (11) in the Supreme Court. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Why Empirical Examination of Seminole Rock Is Important, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE AND
COMMENT (Sept. 13, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/why-empirical-examination-of-seminole
-rock-is-important-by-richard-j-pierce-jr/ [https://perma.cc/8DH2-ACFN].
71
See Pierce & Weiss, supra note 3, at 520. Based on a review of empirical studies,
Professor David Zaring has suggested that courts uphold agency actions in about 70% of
cases regardless of which deference standard is used. Id. at 520 (citing David Zaring,
Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 169 (2010)).
67
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review standard, a recent study suggests that the rate at which agency
decisions are being approved under Auer in the lower federal courts is
not significantly greater than the rate at which agency decisions are
being approved under Chevron.72
Traditionally, courts will defer to agency interpretations of their
own regulations under Auer regardless of the process or tool that the
agency uses to articulate that interpretation. Courts have accorded
agency interpretations deference under Auer regardless of whether the
interpretations are long-standing, whether they were formulated contemporaneously with the regulation, whether they are advanced in testimony
at a congressional hearing, or whether they are advanced for the first
time in amicus briefs in litigation.73 This is different from the approach
that courts take under Chevron, where courts make a threshold determination that an agency has been delegated authority to make a decision
with the force of law and has exercised that authority in making the
decision before according the agency deference with regard to its interpretation of a statute.74
While Auer is a very deferential standard, courts have carved out
exceptions which have narrowed the standard over time.75 For instance,
courts will not accord deference to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation when the regulation merely parrots the language of a statute;76
when regulated parties have not had fair notice of the conduct that is
72

See Pierce & Weiss, supra note 3, at 519–20. Professors Pierce and Weiss examined 219
cases in the federal district and appellate courts between 1991 and 2007 where the court
applied Auer or Seminole Rock deference. Id. They found that courts upheld agency
interpretations in 76.26% of the cases, and that the rate of affirmance was similar in the
district and circuit courts. Id. In a separate study, Professor Cynthia Barmore found that
the rate at which circuit courts approve agency decisions under Auer has declined from
82.3% in 2011–2012 to 76% after the Supreme Court’s Talk America decision. See Cynthia
Barmore, An Empirical Analysis of Auer Deference in the Courts of Appeals, YALE J. REG.:
NOTICE AND COMMENT (Sept. 13, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/an-empirical-analysis-of
-auer-deference-in-the-courts-of-appeals-by-cynthia-barmore [https://perma.cc/92UK-8MCR].
Professor Steve Johnson also notes that agencies receive little deference under Auer in
Tax Court. See also Steve R. Johnson, Seminole Rock in Tax Cases, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE
AND COMMENT (Sept. 15, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/seminole-rock-in-tax-cases-by-steve
-r-johnson-2/ [https://perma.cc/XA9H-DRJE].
73
See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 61, at 48–49; see also Daniel Mensher, Seminole
Rock in Environmental Law: A Window into Weirdness, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE AND
COMMENT (Sept. 15, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/seminole-rock-in-environmental-law-a
-window-into-weirdness-by-daniel-mensher/ [https://perma.cc/SJZ4-YHJP].
74
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
75
See Johnson, supra note 72.
76
See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006).
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required or prohibited by the agency’s interpretation of a regulation;77
when the agency’s interpretation is not a settled or authoritative expression of the agency’s position;78 when the interpretation “does not reflect
the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question”;79
and when a regulation is clear and unambiguous.80
While the Supreme Court has not provided significant guidance
regarding the reasons for Auer deference, academics argue that it is justified for many of the same reasons that Chevron deference is justified.81
First, agencies have greater expertise than courts in interpreting the law
in a manner to advance the statutorily assigned mission of the agency.82
Congress has delegated policymaking authority to the agency and it is
better equipped than courts to exercise that authority.83 Second, agencies
are generally viewed as more politically accountable than the judiciary,
so it is appropriate for agencies to make the policy decisions within the
authority delegated to them by Congress.84 Third, deference advances the

77

See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 U.S. 2156, 2167–68 (2012).
See Gose v. U.S. Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 837–38 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
79
See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
80
See Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
81
See William M. Yeatman, The Simple Solution to Auer Problem 5 (Aug. 29, 2016)
(working paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831651 [https://perma.cc/JC75-3TAK] (last
visited Apr. 4, 2017); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Auer, Now and Forever, YALE
J. REG.: NOTICE AND COMMENT (Sept. 19, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/auer-now-and-for
ever-by-cass-r-sunstein-adrian-vermeule/ [https://perma.cc/7XCE-Z9SL]. While noting
that Auer deference can be justified by many of the same reasons as Chevron deference,
Professors Richard Pierce and Joshua Weiss suggest that there do not seem to be any
reasons to accord agencies greater deference under Auer than under Chevron. See Pierce
& Weiss, supra note 3, at 519.
82
See Pierce & Weiss, supra note 3, at 517. Senator Orrin Hatch argues, however, that
businesses, trade associations, non-profits, and think tanks frequently have superior expertise than agencies and that courts are well equipped to analyze the evidence provided
by all of those parties as well as the agency in determining an appropriate interpretation
of the law. See Hatch, supra note 11. In addition, Hatch argues that agencies are experts
on fact questions, whereas courts are experts on legal questions, so courts should not
defer to agencies on legal questions. Id.
83
Justice Clarence Thomas, however, disagrees, and has argued that Congress cannot
delegate an agency authority to develop a judicially binding interpretation of a law or
regulation because Congress does not have that authority to delegate. See Perez v. Mortg.
Bankers Ass’n, 135 U.S. 1199, 1224 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Under separation of powers principles, he argues, courts, rather than Congress or agencies,
retain the power to interpret the law. Id.
84
See William Funk, Saving Auer, ADMIN. LAW JOTWELL (June 23, 2016), http://adlaw
.jotwell.com/saving-auer/ [https://perma.cc/U7JQ-4W62] (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). Senator
Hatch disagrees, and argues that “[b]y the time a case ends up in court, the policy
78
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goal of uniformity in interpretation of the law. Agencies with national jurisdiction can interpret and apply the law consistently in a way that is not
possible when interpretation is left to federal courts with limited jurisdiction that are likely to reach conflicting conclusions regarding the law.85
In addition to those Chevron-esque reasons for deference, there is
a more fundamental reason for deferring to an agency’s interpretation of
its own regulation. Since the agency drafted the regulation that it is interpreting, it will know better than courts what it intended when it drafted
the regulation.86
B.

Criticisms

While Auer and Seminole Rock deference has survived for more
than seventy years, it has been increasingly criticized over the past few
decades and pressure is mounting to eliminate or reform the doctrine.
There are several bases upon which critics challenge the deference.
Perhaps the most fundamental challenge to Auer/Seminole Rock
deference was raised by Professor John Manning in a law review article
published the year before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Auer.87
Manning argued that deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own
rule effectively authorizes the agency to make and interpret the law,
which violates fundamental principles of separation of powers.88 In order
judgment has already been made . . . [so] the question is which organ of government is
the proper forum for construing a binding legal text.” See Hatch, supra note 11.
85
See Pierce & Weiss, supra note 3, at 517.
86
Id. at 516–17. See Funk, supra note 84. Professors Pierce and Weiss criticize this rationale, though, for a few reasons. First, since agency interpretations are frequently made
long after a regulation is promulgated, the agency officials interpreting the regulation are
unlikely to have been involved in the initial development of the regulation and will not
have any superior knowledge of the drafter’s original intent. Id. at 516. Second, courts
accord agencies Auer deference even when agencies change their interpretation of a
regulation, which suggests that the court may not be concerned with whether the agency’s
interpretation is consistent with some original intent. Id. Justice Clarence Thomas has
also criticized this rationale, arguing that the focus of interpretation should be on the text
of the rules, rather than an agency’s intent. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 U.S.
1199, 1223–24 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
87
See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996).
88
Id. Many other academics and policymakers have identified the separation of powers
concern as a fundamental criticism of the Auer/Seminole Rock deference. See, e.g., Leske,
supra note 9, at 104; Aaron Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 GEO. L. J. 2 (forthcoming
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2821341 [https://perma.cc/C52S-GF8B]; Hatch, supra
note 11. However, Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that the separation of powers concerns are overblown. They argue that when agencies are acting within
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to avoid those separation of powers concerns, Manning and others argue,
an independent judiciary must be free to interpret regulations without
deferring to an agency.89 While Justice Scalia authored the Court’s unanimous opinion in Auer, he eventually embraced Manning’s view and criticized Auer on separation of powers grounds in recent years in concurring
opinions in Talk America v. Michigan Bell Telephone Company90 and
Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center.91 Justice Thomas also
joined in the separation of powers criticism of Auer in a concurring opinion
in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association.92
Closely related to the separation of powers concern, critics argue
that Auer deference violates the requirement in the Administrative
Procedures Act (“APA”)93 that courts reviewing agency actions “shall
decide all relevant questions of law.”94 If courts must defer to agencies’
a legislative grant of statutory authority, all of their actions, including making and interpreting rules, are simply exercises of executive power. See Sunstein & Vermeule,
supra note 81. Sunstein and Vermeule view the criticisms as a more fundamental attack
on basic principles of administrative law and delegation of authority to agencies. They
note, “[t]he argument in favor of independent judicial judgment reflects an emerging,
large-scale distrust of the administrative state, and perhaps a belief that it is constitutionally illegitimate. In our view, that belief is utterly baseless. But even if it is not, the appropriate response is hardly to say that judges, with their own institutional weaknesses and
potential biases, should make the judgments that are entailed by resolving ambiguities
in regulations.” See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of
Auer 2 (Harvard Public Law, Working Paper No. 16-02, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=2716737 [https://perma.cc/KFH4-AG38] (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
89
See Manning, supra note 87, at 617–18. Justice Thomas has argued that the abandonment of the critical check of independent judicial review “permits precisely the accumulation of governmental powers that the framers warned against.” See Perez,135 S. Ct. 1199,
1221 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing The Federalist No. 47, at
302 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
90
Decker v. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr., 564 U.S. 50, 67–69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment).
91
See Perez, 133 U.S. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Scalia wrote “[w]hen the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person, . . . there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.”
Id. (quoting Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws bk. XI, ch. 6, pp. 151–52 (O. Piest ed., T.
Nugent transl. 1949)). He also indicated that he would abandon the doctrine because it
had “no principled basis.” Id. at 1342.
92
See Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217–20 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
93
See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
94
See Hatch, supra note 11; Allyson N. Ho, Why Seminole Rock should Be Overruled,
YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE AND COMMENT (Sept. 19, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/2039-2/
[https://perma.cc/P5XB-M4QN] (last visited Apr. 4, 2017); Leske, supra note 9, at 105;
Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It,
10 ADMIN. L. J. 1, 9–10 (1996).
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interpretations of regulations, critics complain, they are not deciding all
relevant questions of law.95 In the view of those critics, de novo review of
the regulation would be more consistent with the language of the APA.96
Supporters of that argument also stress that while agencies may have
expertise in administering complex regulatory statutes, courts have expertise in interpreting the law.97 Opponents of the argument counter,
though, that interpretation of the law rarely involves purely legal skills.
Instead, it involves consideration of policy issues, an area of agency expertise and agency delegated authority.98
Auer critics also complain that the difference between Auer deference and Chevron deference creates an incentive for agencies to draft
ambiguous regulations and interpret them informally.99 If agencies interpreted statutes clearly in regulations, the critics argue, courts would review
the regulations under the Chevron standard.100 If, however, agencies draft
ambiguous regulations to interpret statutes and then interpret those regulations informally, courts will review the interpretation of the regulations
under the more deferential Auer standard, regardless of the procedures
95
Professor Kathryn Kovacs criticizes the Supreme Court for developing “administrative
common law” that violates the APA and argues that the Court’s failure to address the
tension between Auer deference and the language of the APA in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Association demonstrates the Court’s “continued comfort with administrative common
law.” See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Pixelating Administrative Common Law in Perez v. Mortgage
Bankers Association, 125 YALE L.J. F. 31 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum
/pixelating-administrative-common-law-in-perez-v-mortgage-bankers-association [https://
perma.cc/DJ3W-D7VT].
96
See Ho, supra note 94. Allyson Ho argues that the drafters of the bill believed that
courts should review agency interpretations outside of the rulemaking context “precisely
because the APA exempts them from the safeguards of notice-and-comment rulemaking.”
Id., citing Staff of S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong. (Comm. Print 1945), excerpted
in Administrative Procedure Act: Legislative History, 79th Congress, 1944–46 at 18
(1946). Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue, on the other hand, that the
“argument in favor of independent judicial judgment reflects an emerging, large-scale
distrust of the administrative state, and . . . a belief that it is constitutionally illegitimate,” which they believe is baseless. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 81.
97
See Hatch, supra note 11.
98
See Funk, supra note 84; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 81 (noting that Justice Scalia
insisted that interpretation necessarily involves consideration of policy consequences).
99
See Pierce & Weiss, supra note 3, at 518; Leske, supra note 9, at 104–05; Hatch, supra
note 11. Justice Alito raised this concern in his opinion in Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham, 132 U.S. 2156 (2012) and Justice Scalia raised the concern in his concurring
opinions in Talk Am., Inc. V. Mich. Bell. Tel. Co., 131 U.S. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) and Perez v. Mortg. Bankers, 135 U.S. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
100
See Funk, supra note 84.
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or methods that the agency used to interpret the regulation or announce
that interpretation.101 Those critics suggest that eliminating Auer deference will force agencies to draft clearer regulations.102 Even without Auer
deference, though, agencies have incentives to draft vague regulations that
are fleshed out informally, because the interpretations can be adopted
without the cost and delay of the notice and comment process and without the risk of legal challenge, depending on the manner in which the
interpretations are announced.103
There are other flaws in the “ambiguous rulemaking” criticism to
Auer deference. First, there is very little evidence that agencies draft ambiguous regulations simply to obtain greater judicial deference for a policy
interpretation.104 In a survey of federal agency staff tasked with writing
regulations, only about half of the staff even knew about the Auer doctrine
and fewer than 40% indicated that they consider the doctrine when drafting
rules.105 Reviewing that research, Professor Cynthia Barmore suggests
that “at least some agency officials view their interests as better served by
writing clear rules for regulated entities to follow, rather than by writing
vague rules to be manipulated in litigation.”106 Professors Cass Sunstein
and Adrian Vermeule also note that agencies have a counter incentive to
draft clear rules so that the agency interpretation will remain in place
when there is a change in administration unless the new administration

101

Id.
See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 61, at 51.
103
See Pierce & Weiss, supra note 3, at 518.
104
See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 81; Funk, supra note 84; see also Ronald M.
Levin, Auer and the Incentives Issue, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE AND COMMENT (Sept. 19, 2016),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/auer-and-the-incentives-issue-by-ronald-m-levin/ [https://perma.cc
/6XPG-AW3A] (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). Professor Ronald Levin notes that in none of the
cases where Supreme Court Justices raised concerns about the incentive to draft ambiguous
rules did any Justice find that an agency had drafted a deliberately vague rule and he notes
that critics of Auer have not even produced any anecdotes, let alone specific cites, of cases
where agency regulators had deliberately drafted ambiguous rules. Id. While agencies may
not deliberately draft ambiguous regulations to obtain Auer deference, Professor Levin
admits that other factors could encourage agencies to daft vague regulations, id., and
Professor Aaron Nielson suggests that agencies frequently “accept ambiguous regulations
because obtaining specificity requires more resources.” See Nielson, supra note 88, at 11.
105
See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STANFORD L.
REV. 999, 1019–20 (2015). Professor Ronald Levin also points out that when, in 2015, the
GAO conducted a survey of officials at four federal agencies regarding what factors they
considered in deciding whether to issue guidance or regulations, none of the officials
identified judicial review as a factor. See Levin, supra note 104.
106
Barmore, supra note 72.
102
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pursues the burdensome task of repealing the rule through notice and
comment procedures.107
Regardless of whether agency officials draft vague rules in order
to take advantage of Auer deference, though, there is a deeper flaw in the
“ambiguous rulemaking” criticism. As Professor Aaron Nielson and others
have pointed out, agencies frequently have statutory authority to choose
to interpret laws to advance specific policies in a variety of procedural
ways.108 It is rare that a statute will require an agency to announce its
interpretation of the statute in rulemaking. When an agency has a choice
of procedures for interpreting a statute, such as rulemaking and adjudication, it is a bedrock principle of administrative law that courts will defer
to the agency’s choice of procedure.109 Thus, if Auer deference were eliminated, an agency that wanted to retain discretion to interpret a statute
and would have issued an ambiguous rule under Auer to retain that discretion will likely choose to forego the time and expense of issuing a
regulation (which may be challenged in court upon issuance) or choose
to leave the issue on which the agency wishes to retain discretion unaddressed in any regulation.110 The agency can then interpret the statute
in accordance with the agency’s preferred policy reading of the statute in
a subsequent adjudication (and apply it retroactively) or announce it in
a guidance document (which consumes less time and resources and normally cannot be immediately challenged).111 Depending on the procedures
that the agency uses to interpret the statute at that time, the agency’s
interpretation may be accorded Chevron deference.112
Auer critics also complain that, since courts accord deference to
agencies’ interpretations of regulations regardless of the procedures that
agencies use to announce those interpretations, regardless of the timing
of the announcement of those interpretations, and regardless of whether
the interpretations change prior interpretations of law or are unexpected,
the standard encourages agencies to interpret the laws that they administer in ways that do not provide adequate notice to the regulated community
regarding the requirements of the laws.113 At the extreme, critics argue
107

See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 81; see also Nielson, supra note 88, at 25.
See Nielson, supra note 88, at 3.
109
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
110
See Nielson, supra note 88, at 3–5.
111
Id.
112
See Mead, 533 U.S. at 218, 226–27 (2001); Christensen, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
113
See Kevin M. Stack, Seminole Rock, Step One, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE AND COMMENT
(Sept. 14, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/seminole-rock-step-one-by-kevin-m-stack/ [https://
perma.cc/R38X-MFD7]; see also Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support
108
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that application of Auer deference conflicts with the rule of lenity, in that
it leads to punishment of persons who do not have notice that their conduct is prohibited.114 Despite those criticisms, as noted above, if Auer
deference were eliminated, agencies would likely interpret laws in less
formal ways that would provide the regulated community less notice than
agencies are providing when they adopt ambiguous rules and clarify them
through guidance documents.115
In addition to the preceding criticisms, opponents of Auer deference
argue that it is inappropriate to accord deference to agency interpretations
of regulations without regard to the procedural manner in which those
interpretations were made. The critics note that courts defer to agencies’
interpretations of statutes under Chevron only after making a threshold
determination that Congress gave the agency the authority to interpret
the statute in a way that has the force of law and that the agency exercised
of Petitioners, Foster v. Vilsack (U.S. Sept. 12, 2016) (No. 16-186), http://www.pacificlegal
.org/file/Cato-Institute-Amicus-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/94MF-55VD]; Amici Curiae
Brief of American Farm Bureau Federation & South Dakota Farm Bureau Federation
in Support of Petition for Certiorari, Foster v. Vilsack (U.S. Sept. 12, 2016) (No. 16-186),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/16-186-cert-amicus-AFBF.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LMW-X9Q6] [hereinafter American Farm Bureau Amicus Brief]. The
American Farm Bureau suggests that application of Auer deference raises “serious due
process concerns” and “effectively biases and prejudges the case”. Id. Professor Kevin
Stack argues that the notice concern could be addressed, to some extent, by limiting Auer
to require courts to give great weight to the preamble in an agency’s regulation when
interpreting the agency’s subsequent interpretation of that regulation. Stack argues that
this is appropriate because the preamble for the regulation “is the agency’s official justification of the regulation, issued contemporaneously with the regulation, . . . [t]he basis for
judicial review of the validity of the regulations . . . [and] preambles undergo extensive
consideration and vetting both inside the agency and by other executive branch officials.”
Id. Stack suggests that focusing on the preamble in determining whether to uphold an
agency’s interpretation of a regulation would provide more notice to the regulated community regarding the requirements of the regulation (by narrowing the scope of permissible
interpretations of the regulation) and will encourage agencies to provide more guidance
to the regulated community in preambles (in order to obtain deference for the subsequent
interpretations). Id. While critics complain that Auer diminishes notice for the regulated
community, Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule counter that Auer is frequently invoked to support an agency’s response to a request for clarification from a
regulated class or to support an agency’s assurance that it will not overreach under an
ambiguous provision of a regulation. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 81. In those
cases, “Auer is . . . an engine of predictability and . . . deregulation—though the Supreme
Court, and even academic commentators, are not likely to see that.” Id.
114
See Amicus Brief of the Cato Institute, supra note 113, at 10–12. In the amicus brief
in Foster v. Vilsack, lawyers for the Cato Institute argued that Auer deference allows
“[a]ny government lawyer with a laptop [to] create a new federal crime by adding a
footnote to a friend of the court brief.” Id. at 11.
115
See Nielson, supra note 88, at 5.
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that authority when interpreting the statute (frequently through notice
and comment rulemaking or formal adjudication).116 They suggest that
it is anomalous that courts do not require something similar before deferring to agencies’ interpretations of regulations under Auer.117 Allyson
Ho criticizes the willingness of courts to accord Auer deference to agency
interpretations of regulations regardless of the context in which an agency
interpretation arises as offensive to “the principle that there should be
either more rigorous process on the front end of agency action (i.e., notice
and comment rulemaking) or less deference on the back end (i.e., plenary
judicial review).”118
The criticisms by academics and Supreme Court Justices have
fueled speculation that Auer could be overruled.119 However, while Justices
Alito, Scalia and Thomas criticized Auer in their concurrences in Perez
v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, six Justices, including Justice Kennedy and
the Chief Justice, joined the court’s opinion in that case, which recognized the continuing vitality of Auer.120 In addition, in May, 2016, by a
7–1 vote, the Court denied a cert. petition in United Student Aid Funds
v. Bible that asked the Court to overturn Auer.121 While the Supreme
Court may not be ready to overrule Auer yet, it is possible that the Court
could further limit its reach in the near future. In October, 2016, the Court
granted cert. in Gloucester County School Board v. G.G.122 While the petitioner initially asked the Court to overturn Auer, the Court only agreed
to consider whether it was appropriate for the lower court to accord Auer
deference to a unpublished letter ruling of the Department of Education.123
In resolving that question, though, the Court could adopt further limitations on Auer, without overruling it.
C.

Suggested Reforms

In light of the criticisms outlined in the preceding section, academics
have suggested a range of reforms to Auer. The most extreme “reform”
is the elimination of deference to agency interpretations of regulations.124
116

See Mensher, supra note 73; Ho, supra note 94.
See Mensher, supra note 73; Ho, supra note 94.
118
See Ho, supra note 94.
119
See Leske, supra note 9, at 107; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 81.
120
135 U.S. 1199 (2015).
121
136 U.S.1607 (2016).
122
See 2016 U.S. LEXIS 6408 (U.S., Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders
/courtorders/102816zr_feag.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2FP-JCM6] (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
123
Id.
124
See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 88, at 1; Funk, supra note 84.
117
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Supporters of this option argue that courts should review agency interpretations of regulations de novo, since that is required by the APA and
separation of powers principles.125 Proposed federal legislation would
codify this approach.126
Other reform proposals are more moderate. In response to the
concern that Auer is applied too broadly to interpretations that are made
informally, many commentators have advocated for a “step zero” approach to Auer.127 Under such an approach, courts would first focus on
the manner in which the agency articulated its interpretation and several other factors related to the nature of the interpretation to determine
whether the interpretation is entitled to Auer deference. Professors Sanne
Knudsen and Amy Wildermuth suggest that courts applied a “step zero”
approach to Seminole Rock in its early years, so a modification of the
modern Auer test would be consistent with its historical roots.128 They
suggest that courts should not defer to agency interpretations of regulations unless the interpretations appear in a public and widely available
document and unless the interpretations were published near in time to
the regulation or were consistently held over a long period of time.129
Many commentators argue that courts should not apply Auer when agencies use informal procedures to interpret regulations, since courts would
not apply Chevron when agencies use informal procedures to interpret
statutes.130 The petitioners in Gloucester County School Board v. G.G.
asked the Court to limit Auer in that manner.131 In an amicus brief in the
125

See supra notes 88–98 and accompanying text.
Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017, H.R. 76, 115th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2;
Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong., 1st Sess.; Separation of Powers
Restoration Act of 2016, S. 2724, 114th Cong., 2d Sess.; Separation of Powers Restoration
and Second Amendment Protection Act, H.R. 4321, 114th Cong., 2d Sess. (2016).
127
See Conor Clarke, Why the Supreme Court Might Not Overrule Seminole Rock, YALE
J. REG.: NOTICE AND COMMENT (Sept. 21, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/why-the-supreme
-court-might-not-overrule-seminole-rock-by-conor-clarke/ [https://perma.cc/Y5GH-WZPM];
Yeatman, supra note 81, at 1–5, 7–9.
128
See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 61, at 54–61. Professors Knudsen and
Wildermuth argue that Seminole Rock deference was only accorded to official agency
interpretations, usually published contemporaneously with the regulation. Id. at 52–55.
129
Id. at 102–04.
130
See, e.g., Yeatman, supra note 81, at 1–5. Critics argue that failing to consider the procedures used by agencies before deferring under Auer creates a loophole through procedural
safeguards put in place by Chevron’s focus on procedures. Id. at 5. William Yeatman
argues that all of the reasons that are advanced as justification for limiting deference to
agencies under Chevron through a “step zero” analysis apply equally to limiting deference
to agencies under Auer. Id. at 9–12.
131
See Brief of Petitioner, Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. (U.S. Jan. 3, 2017) (No.
16-273), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/16-273-pet-merits-brief
126
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same case, Professors Ronald Cass, Christopher Demuth, and Christopher
Walker, advocated for a “step zero” approach that considers the following
factors: (1) whether the interpretation was adopted simultaneously with
the regulation; (2) whether the interpretation was broadly disseminated;
(3) whether Congress authorized the agency to make such interpretations with the force of law; (4) whether the agency used relatively formal
procedures to interpret the regulation; and (5) the degree of public accessibility to the interpretation.132
Other commentators have advocated for an Auer “two step” analysis,
similar to the Chevron “two step.”133 While several different “two step”
alternatives have been suggested, all of the reformers propose the same
first step. As in Chevron, advocates for an Auer “two step” propose that
courts should begin the Auer analysis by examining the language of the
regulation that the agency is interpreting to determine whether the
regulation is truly ambiguous.134 Supporters of this reform argue that the
Supreme Court only deferred to the agency regulation in the original
Seminole Rock decision after engaging in a searching examination of the
regulation.135 While all of the “two step” proponents agree on a new Auer
“step one,” they part ways on the appropriate level of deference at “step
two.” Professors Sanne Knudsen and Amy Wildermuth suggest that courts
should accord the agency interpretation the traditional strong level of
deference that courts accord agencies under Auer today.136 Professor
Michael Healy suggests that courts should accord agencies Skidmore

.pdf [https://perma.cc/QCK3-GR33]. The petitioners argued, “[t]he most plausible solution
that preserves Auer is to maintain the symmetry and consistency of the Chevron and
Auer deference doctrines. If the Department [of Education] wants documents . . . to have
controlling weight in court, it should follow procedures sufficient to give them the force
of law. If the Department does not want to follow those procedures, it should not expect
its positions to merit controlling deference.” Id. at 59.
132
See Brief of Professors—Dean Ronald A. Cass, Christopher C. Demuth, Sr., and
Christopher J. Walker—as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Gloucester County
School Board v. G.G. (U.S. Jan. 10, 2017) (No. 16-273), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-con
tent/uploads/2017/01/16-273_amicus_pet_professors_dean_ronald_a_cass_christopher_c
_demuth_sr_and_christopher_j_walker.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EN5-P52N].
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See Kevin Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE AND
COMMENT (Sept. 20, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/between-seminole-rock-and-a-hard-place
-a-new-approach-to-agency-deference-by-kevin-leske/[https://perma.cc/QNP6-P4HB];
Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 61, at 104–05; Healey, supra note 9, at 677–78.
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See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 61, at 104–05; Healey, supra note 9, at
637–40.
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See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 61, at 60–61.
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deference in “step two” of a reformed Auer analysis,137 and Professor Kevin
Leske suggests that courts should accord agencies a level of deference
that falls between Chevron and Skidmore in the new “step two.”138
In lieu of de novo review, Auer “step zero,” or an Auer “two step,”
some academics have recommended that courts review agency interpretations of regulations under the Skidmore analysis.139 Professors Knudsen
and Wildermuth argue that the deference that courts accorded to agencies in the early cases applying Seminole Rock more closely resembled
Skidmore deference than the strong deference of the modern Auer doctrine, so it is appropriate for courts to return to that level of deference.140
In fact, they suggest that the Court’s SmithKline Beecham case signaled
a shift in the nature of Auer deference toward something that more
closely resembles Skidmore deference.141 Professor William Funk has also
suggested that courts should review agency interpretations of regulations
under Skidmore, but his proposal is based on different reasoning.142 Funk
argues that when agencies are trying to determine whether to interpret
a vague regulation by amending the rule or issuing a guidance document,
agencies have strong incentives to interpret the rule by guidance, to avoid
the cost, delay, and potential legal challenges associated with amending
the rule.143 If courts accorded Skidmore deference to an agency’s interpretations of regulations, rather than Auer deference, Funk argues, agencies
would have an incentive to amend vague rules through rulemaking,
137

See Healey, supra note 9, at 678, 693.
See Leske, supra note 133. Leske suggests that courts should apply four factors at
“step two” to determine the extent to which to defer to an agency’s interpretation of an
ambiguous regulation: “(1) the administrative agency’s stated intent at the time of the
regulation’s promulgation; (2) whether the interpretation currently advanced has been
consistently held; (3) in what format the interpretation appears; and (4) whether the
regulation merely restates or ‘parrots’ the statutory language.” Id.
139
See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 61, at 94–95; Funk, supra note 84; Bednar,
supra note 69; Healey, supra note 9, at 678, 693. Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian
Vermeule, however, disagree that Skidmore is an appropriate replacement for Auer. See
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 88, at 21. First, they argue that if critics believe that
Auer is flawed because according deference to the agency’s interpretation of a regulation
vests it, for all intents and purposes, with law making and law interpreting power in
violation of separation of powers, according Skidmore deference to the interpretation raises
similar separation-of-powers concerns. Id. In addition, they argue that the Skidmore
standard, as applied, is only marginally less deferential than Auer, so it doesn’t make
sense to change the standards when Auer has worked well for decades. Id.
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See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 61, at 94–95.
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rather than guidance, in order to obtain a greater level of deference for
their interpretation.144
While academics have proposed a range of modifications for Auer
deference, some commentators suggest that a change in the standard
that courts use to review agency interpretations of regulations may ultimately have little effect on the outcome of judicial challenges to those
decisions.145 Although agency interpretations have been upheld in 91%
of the Auer cases in the Supreme Court, studies suggest that the judicial
approval rate in Auer cases in the lower federal courts is much closer to
the approval rate for agency decisions under Chevron, Skidmore, or a
range of other agency deference standards. Professors Richard Pierce and
Joshua Weiss reviewed 219 cases in the federal district and appellate
courts between 1999 and 2007 and found that courts upheld agency actions
under Auer in 76.26% of the cases.146 Prior studies by other researchers
found that courts uphold agency decisions under Chevron between 64%–
81% of the time and under Skidmore between 55%–71% of the time.147 In
a separate study, Professor Cynthia Barmore found that the rate at which
courts approve agency decisions under Auer has fallen from 82.3% before
SmithKline Beecham to below 70.6% since Talk America.148 Professor
David Zaring149 and Professor Richard Pierce have separately concluded,
after reviewing a variety of empirical studies of deference, that courts
uphold agency decisions in 70% of cases regardless of the deference standard that the courts apply.150 William Yeatman examined a sampling of
cases in all of the federal appellate courts between 1993 and 2013 and he
found that, since 2006, the government has only prevailed in 71% of the
Auer cases, which is similar to the 69% government success rate in
Chevron cases during his study period.151 Yeatman suggests that replacing Auer deference with Skidmore deference over the twenty-year period
of his study would have resulted in one fewer agency interpretation every
five years surviving judicial review in each circuit.152 He suggests that it
would fall to one fewer agency interpretation every eight years if courts
144
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added a “step zero” to the Auer analysis.153 If Auer deference is not, in
reality, significantly stronger than the other deference standards, modification of Auer deference may ultimately have little impact on the rate at
which courts uphold agency interpretations of regulations. Professor
Barmore argues, therefore, that overruling Auer “would accomplish little
beyond removing a useful tool that facilitates judicial review, increases
the predictability of regulatory action, and maintains political accountability in agency decision-making.”154
III.

THE STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF AN AGENCY’S INTERPRETATION OF
GUIDANCE INTERPRETING REGULATIONS

While academics, policymakers, and the courts continue to grapple
with the appropriate level of deference courts should accord to agency interpretations of regulations, a new debate has begun regarding the level of
deference courts should accord to agency interpretations of guidance
interpreting regulations. While some critics suggest that courts should
review those interpretations de novo, without according agencies any
deference,155 there are compelling reasons for courts to accord those
interpretations Skidmore deference or to accord them a level of deference
equivalent to the deference courts accord to agency interpretations of
regulations, whether that is Auer or some modification of Auer.
A.

The Case for Skidmore

First, in almost every other situation when a court is reviewing
an agency’s decision, the court accords the agency’s decision some deference, usually because Congress has entrusted the agency with the authority
to make the decision and the agency is exercising some expertise in making
the decision. When the court is reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a
statute pursuant to a delegation of authority to interpret it with the force
of law, the court accords the agency interpretation Chevron deference.156
When the court is reviewing other agency interpretations of statutes, the
court accords the agency Skidmore deference.157 When the court is reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a regulation, the court accords the
153
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See Barmore, supra note 72.
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Bureau Amicus Brief, supra note 113, at 9.
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agency Auer deference.158 When the court is reviewing agency fact-finding, the court accords the agency varying levels of deference depending
on whether the agency is finding the facts through formal or informal
procedures.159 The Administrative Procedure Act’s judicial review provisions reserve de novo review for cases where agency actions, findings, or
conclusions are “unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court,”160 and the Supreme Court
has interpreted that section of the law to only apply to situations where
an agency is adjudicating, and its fact-finding procedures are inadequate
or issues that were not before an agency are raised in a proceeding to
enforce non-adjudicatory agency action.161 Since courts accord some deference to almost every other agency decision, it would seem strange to deny
agency interpretations of their own guidance documents some level of
deference. As perhaps the weakest form of deference, Skidmore deference,
at a minimum, would seem to be appropriate. Under Skidmore, when
determining whether to defer to an agency’s decisions, courts consider the
thoroughness of the agency’s consideration, the formality of procedures
used by the agency, the validity of the agency’s reasoning, the consistency
of the agency’s interpretation, whether the interpretation is longstanding
or contemporaneous, and the agency’s level of expertise on the issue.162
B.

The Case for Auer or a Modified Auer

While courts should, at a minimum, accord Skidmore deference
to agency interpretations of guidance interpreting regulations, there are
strong arguments that support according those interpretations the same
level of deference that courts accord to an agency’s interpretations of its
regulations, whether that standard remains Auer or is modified in some
manner.
158

See Auer, 519 U.S. at 452, 454–57 (1997).
Courts review agency fact-finding under the “substantial evidence” test when agencies
make decisions through formal rulemaking or formal adjudication, see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)
(2012), and under the “arbitrary and capricious” test if they do not. In either case, the
court accords the agency some level of deference.
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See id. at § 706(2)(F). Interestingly, while the federal legislation that has been introduced to eliminate Chevron and Auer deference, see Hatch, supra note 11, which provides
for de novo judicial review of regulations, it does not explicitly provide for de novo judicial
review of guidance documents.
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See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
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First, all of the justifications that have been advanced to support
Auer deference for an agency’s interpretation of its regulations apply
with equal force to an agency’s interpretation of its guidance interpreting
regulations. In the same way that agencies are better equipped than
courts to use their expertise in interpreting the law in a manner to advance the statutorily assigned mission of the agency when they interpret
regulations,163 they are better equipped than courts to use that expertise
when they interpret guidance that interprets regulations. Similarly, as
the drafter of guidance, the agency is in a better position than a court to
interpret the intent of the drafter.164 Agencies are not considering statutory
interpretation canons when drafting guidance documents and are focusing heavily on policy considerations related to their mission when drafting guidance, so interpretation of the guidance documents should not
turn simply on traditional tools of statutory interpretation, which would
be within the expertise of the judiciary.165 Additionally, just as according
Auer deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations leads
to greater uniformity in application of the law,166 according similar deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own guidance interpreting regulations achieves similar results. Finally, to the extent that the superior
political accountability of agencies as opposed to courts justifies Auer
deference,167 agencies are equally accountable when interpreting guidance documents as when interpreting regulations. Consequently, all of
the reasons that have been advanced to justify Auer deference to agency
interpretations of regulations apply equally to agency interpretations of
guidance interpreting regulations.
More importantly, though, most of the concerns that have been
raised by Auer’s critics regarding deference to agency interpretation of
regulations do not apply as forcefully to agency interpretations of guidance interpreting regulations.
For instance, critics cannot argue that according deference to an
agency’s interpretations of guidance will encourage the agency to draft
vague guidance in the way that according deference to an agency’s interpretations of regulations encourages the agency to draft vague regulations. Even if agencies truly adopted vague regulations so that they could
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retain discretion to interpret them informally and obtain deference for
the interpretations while avoiding the time, cost, and potential legal challenges associated with interpreting the regulation in a new or modified
regulation, agencies have no incentive to adopt vague guidance documents
to interpret regulations. A guidance document can be adopted with very
few procedures and is not binding, so an agency is not retaining any significant interpretive discretion when it adopts a vague guidance document.168
When agencies adopt guidance documents to interpret regulations, they
can change those guidance documents with very few procedures, so they
incur little cost or delay in adopting a new interpretation.169 Similarly,
neither the original guidance document nor any amended guidance document is likely to be subject to immediate judicial challenge.170 Further,
since the agency’s interpretation of a regulation in the original guidance
document would be entitled to Auer deference, the agency would not obtain a higher level of deference for its interpretation by articulating it as
an interpretation of guidance, rather than simply incorporating it into
amended guidance. All that an agency would “gain” by adopting a vague
guidance document would be to confuse agency staff and the regulated
community. Few commentators would suggest that those are goals that
agencies typically seek to advance.
Since according strong deference to agency interpretations of
guidance interpreting regulations will not encourage agencies to draft
vague guidance, it is difficult to argue, as in the context of Auer deference
to agency interpretations of regulations, that application of that strong
deference will result in lack of notice to the regulated community regarding agencies’ interpretations of the law and lead to unfair retroactive
application of the law.171 In fact, if courts were to review agency interpretations of guidance interpreting regulations de novo, instead of according
them strong deference, while continuing to defer to agency interpretations of regulations under Auer or a similarly strong level of deference,
that could encourage agencies to refrain from issuing guidance in the
first place and to interpret regulations through adjudication, as they
would likely have the option to do under Supreme Court precedent.172
168
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After all, if the agency interpreted the regulation through adjudication,
courts would accord the interpretation strong deference under Auer. If,
however, the agency adopted guidance to interpret the regulation and
needed to interpret that guidance when applying it in adjudication, courts
would review the agency’s interpretation de novo. To the extent that
application of a de novo review standard to agency interpretations of
guidance interpreting regulations encouraged agencies to avoid issuing
guidance to interpret regulations, the regulated community would have
less notice about the agency’s interpretation of their rights and obligations under the law. It would be more likely, in those cases, that the
regulated community would first learn about the agency’s interpretation
of its regulations when the regulations were applied to them. Application
of a de novo standard, rather than a strong deference standard, to agency
interpretations of guidance interpreting regulations could, therefore, lead
to the notice and retroactivity concerns that critics level against application of the Auer standard to agency interpretations of regulations.
Just as the “incentive to draft vague rules” criticism and the “lack
of notice” and retroactivity criticisms could not be forcefully raised to
challenge the application of Auer or similarly strong deference to agency
interpretations of guidance interpreting regulations, the Auer separationof-powers criticism, discussed above, would also be inapposite. While
critics complain that according deference to an agency’s interpretation of
its regulations violates separation of powers because it allows the agency
to make law and interpret the law,173 the criticism should not carry any
weight with regard to agency interpretations of guidance, since guidance
lacks the force of law.
Therefore, most of the reasons that courts defer to agency interpretations of regulations under Auer would justify deference to agency
interpretations of guidance interpreting regulations, while most of the
criticisms raised against application of Auer do not apply, or apply less
forcefully, when considered as challenges to Auer or Auer-like deference
to agency interpretations of guidance interpreting regulations.174
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While not discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the claim that Auer deference violates the APA, see supra notes 93–96, is no more persuasive when raised to challenge
deference to agency interpretations of guidance interpreting regulations than when it has
been raised to challenge deference to agency interpretations of regulations. Although the
APA authorizes courts to “decide all relevant questions of law,” see 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012),
the statute does not explicitly provide for de novo review and does not preclude judicial
deference to agency interpretations, regardless of the context in which they arise. If the
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CONCLUSION
In an era when Supreme Court Justices, academics, and politicians are criticizing Auer deference for agency interpretations of regulations, and advocating reform or elimination of the deference, it may be
unlikely that courts will expand the reach of Auer to cover agency interpretations of guidance interpreting regulations. However, for all of the
reasons outlined above, it is clear that courts should accord those agency
interpretations some deference, whether it is Skidmore, Auer, or some
modified version of Auer.
In some ways, all of the hand-wringing over the appropriate level
of deference for agency interpretations of regulations and for agency interpretations of guidance interpreting regulations is overblown. After all,
at the end of the day, there is no guarantee that courts will uphold the
ultimate decision that an agency makes merely because the courts uphold
the agency’s interpretation of a regulation or of guidance interpreting a
regulation. If, for instance, a court upholds an agency’s interpretation of
guidance interpreting a regulation, the court could still find either that
the guidance, as interpreted by the agency, is a plainly erroneous interpretation of the regulation under Auer, or that the regulation, as interpreted through the guidance and interpretation, is outside of the agency’s
statutory authority or unreasonable under Chevron.175 Similarly, even
though a court upholds an agency’s interpretation of guidance interpreting a regulation, the court could find (1) that the agency’s interpretation
of the guidance, the guidance itself (as interpreted by the agency) or the
regulation (as interpreted by the guidance and interpretation of the
guidance) violates the constitution; or (2) that the agency’s interpretation
of the guidance, the guidance itself (as interpreted by the agency) or the
regulation (as interpreted by the guidance and interpretation of the
guidance) is arbitrary and capricious.176 There are many ways that a
court could invalidate an agency’s ultimate decision while finding that
the agency correctly interpreted the guidance that it wrote.
Supreme Court ultimately modifies the level of deference accorded to agency interpretations of regulations, for all of the reasons outlined in this part of the Article, the level of
deference accorded to agency interpretations of guidance interpreting regulations should
be at least as strong as the modified level of deference adopted by the Court for interpretations of regulations.
175
See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 61, at 61; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note
88, at 19.
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Auer may or may not survive as the standard of review for agency
interpretations of regulations. Nevertheless, absent adoption of legislation
that broadly eliminates judicial deference for agency decision-making,
courts are unlikely to replace Auer deference with de novo review. Courts
will likely continue to accord some deference to agency interpretations of
regulations. As long as courts continue to accord some deference to agency
interpretations of regulations, courts should accord the same amount of
deference, or at least some deference, to agency interpretations of guidance interpreting regulations for all of the reasons outlined above.

